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Executive summary 
The international chemical and biological weapons disarmament and non-proliferation regimes 
centred on the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC) face multi-faceted challenges in a period of significant international 
discord. In this report we examine the scope of possibilities for strengthening these regimes and 
identify specific proposals that should be at the forefront of the considerations of the BTWC 
and CWC States Parties. 
In regard to the BTWC States Parties should: 
- Promote the peaceful uses of life sciences through cooperation and assistance under the
Convention. States Parties should further develop and enhance the implementation of
the BTWC Cooperation Database.
- Ensure that the security implications of life sciences research are effectively assessed
and managed in an agreed review process. The development of a biological security
code of conduct for life scientists can strengthen the review process of relevant scientific
and technological advances.
- Promote the full and effective national implementation of the BTWC by improving the
system of Confidence Building Measures, enhancing stakeholder engagement with the
Convention, and strengthening the utility of Peer Review Exercises.
- Promote the implementation of an integrated approach to countering the threat of
deliberate disease. Strengthening international coordination, cooperation, and capacity
building under the BTWC can advance global health security and prevent the hostile
misuse of life sciences.
- Consider possible approaches and measures for the institutional strengthening of the
Convention. It is essential that an Intersessional Programme of Work is agreed at the
Ninth Review Conference in 2021 and that the mandate and resources of the
Implementation Support Unit are expanded.
In regard to the CWC 
- There is no single pathway to justice in regard to the use of chemical weapons in Syria. 
There remains a need for sustained plurilateral State support for a wide range of 
investigatory, archival and criminal mechanisms which will ensure that those who have 
breached the global chemical weapon prohibition are identified and held accountable.
- States must support intelligence sharing, international investigative and criminal 
procedures in relation to recent uses of Novichoks and support OPCW expert review 
and updating of CWC verification schedules and declaration processes to address 
challenges posed by this group of agents.
- Until the OPCW collectively determines the applicability of the CWC with regard to 
the use of CNS-acting chemicals for law enforcement purposes, CWC States Parties 
should introduce national moratoria on development, manufacture, promotion, transfer, 
acquisition, stockpiling and use of all weapons employing such agents.
- All CWC State Parties must uphold the prohibition on use of riot control agents as a 
"method of warfare". They must further ensure that RCA use for law enforcement 
purposes is consistent both with international human rights law and the Chemical 
Weapons Convention cognisant of the increased health risks due to COVID-19.
- All CWC State Parties should collectively establish an OPCW process to determine 
those RCA delivery mechanisms that are prohibited under the Chemical Weapons 
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1. The First Report of the Joint Committee on National Security Strategy for the Session 2019 
-21 on Biosecurity and national security1 focussed on the challenges of integrating the various 
means of biological security governance within the United Kingdom but noted that: “Future 
biological risks to the UK will evolve rapidly, originating within or beyond its borders. These 
prospects encompass other serious disease outbreaks, but also the ‘slow burn’ risk of anti-
microbial resistance and reducing barriers to the (accidental or deliberate) spread of harmful 
biological substances.” The following report considers the challenges faced and opportunities 
for integrating and strengthening the various means of biological and chemical security 
governance external to the UK in relation to the chemical and biological weapons disarmament 
and non-proliferation regimes. The COVID-19 global pandemic and recent cases of chemical 
weapon use (e.g., in Syria and against the Skripals in the UK and Alexey Navalny in Russia) 
have demonstrated the reality and multifaceted nature of biological and chemical threats that 
all States face in the twenty-first century. These threats have also underscored the importance 
of strengthening the international norms against the hostile misuse of chemical and biological 
sciences enshrined in the 1975 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the 
1997 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The purpose of this report is to review the 
‘health’ of the BTWC and CWC and identify practical opportunities to strengthen these critical 
Conventions and guarantee their relevance against the backdrop of rapid scientific and 
technological advancement and growing international instability.  
 
2 The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)  
2. The 1975 BTWC is the first multilateral agreement that outlaws an entire class of weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD).2 States Parties to the Convention undertake to adopt appropriate 
measures for ensuring that advances, materials, and knowledge in the life sciences are used 
only for peaceful, prophylactic, and protective purposes. The 2018 UK Biological Security 
Strategy contributes to strengthening the norm against deliberate disease, not least because it 
advances an all-hazards approach to countering natural, accidental, and deliberate risks for 
human, animal, and plant health.3 The need for a multifaceted and multi-layered, internationally 
coordinated set of measures for managing the risk that life sciences may be accidentally or 
deliberately misused is at the forefront of the considerations of BTWC States Parties. Every 
five years, States Parties hold a Review Conference during which key decisions on the operation 
of the Convention are made. Since 2002, each Review Conference has been preceded by an 
Intersessional Programme (ISP) of work comprising biannual meetings: Meeting of Experts 
and Meeting of States Parties. The current ISP 2017-2021 is focused on five thematic areas, 
including cooperation and assistance for promoting the peaceful use of the life sciences; review 
of scientific and technological advances; national implementation; preparedness and assistance 
in case of an alleged use of biological weapons; and institutional strengthening. The Ninth 
Review Conference of the BTWC is to take place in 2021. The following sections review key 
proposals that are being considered by States Parties under each of the five topics addressed as 
part of the current BTWC ISP and outline practical recommendations on strengthening the 





webinars was held during November and December that reviewed current thinking on these 
topics amongst States Parties. 
Cooperation and Assistance (MX1) 
3. Under Article X of the BTWC, States Parties have the right to enjoy, the “fullest possible 
exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information”4 of biological 
agents and toxins for peaceful purposes. States Parties have reached additional understandings 
and agreements relating to Article X during previous Review Conferences.5 At the Eighth 
Review Conference, member countries of the Global Partnership6 gave a detailed account of 
such projects, and the UK7 has given an overview of its contributions. At the Seventh Review 
Conference States Parties agreed to create a database system, established and administered by 
the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) of the BWC, to facilitate requests for and offers of 
exchange of assistance and cooperation among States Parties.8 In the current Intersessional 
Process 2017-2021, approaches and concepts for strengthening Article X of the Convention are 
considered under the topic Cooperation and Assistance, with a Particular Focus on 
Strengthening Cooperation and Assistance under Article X (MX1). At the last discussion on 
this topic, convened online in December 2020, a wide range of activities were discussed. 
Additionally, the US set out a strategy9 for better implementation of the database including a 
3-step process to increase the number of annual reports regarding cooperation and assistance 
obligations, turning the database into a more comprehensive and useful tool, and via an 
initiative supported by both the US and India, the creation of a position within the ISU to 
support cooperation. 
 
Review of Science and Technology under the BTWC (MX2) 
4. Article I of the BTWC bans “microbial or other biological agents, or toxins, whatever their 
origin or method of production” that “have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other 
peaceful purposes”.10 This is known as the General Purpose Criterion and seeks to promote the 
legitimate uses of life sciences. The rapid progress of life sciences and related fields over the 
past few decades raises multifaceted security challenges to the operation of the Convention, not 
least because the same advances (e.g., genome editing) that contribute to combatting disease 
might also facilitate the development of sophisticated biological and toxin weapons. In the 
current Intersessional Programme 2017-2021, approaches for reconciling the benefits and 
biological security risks of novel life sciences advances are considered by the annual Meeting 
of Experts on Review of Developments in the Field of Science and Technology Related to the 
Convention (MX2). The joint impact of several factors such as technological convergence, 
growing interest in citizen science, and the increased availability and accessibility of scientific 
information has been identified as an area of particular concern to the BTWC.11 Proposals for 
strengthening the review process of science and technology within the Convention include the 
establishment of a designated review body and the development of a model code of conduct for 
biological scientists.12 To ensure effective management of the security implications of novel 
technologies, the UK has underscored the value of fostering sustained dialogue and engagement 
between scientific and security communities.13 In 2019, the World Organisation for Animal 





framework for biological security risk mitigation which stresses the importance of multi-
stakeholder interaction and biological security awareness within the life sciences.14 Its 
implementation requires the development of tailored practical approaches and tools. 
National Implementation of the BTWC (MX3) 
5. Article IV of the BTWC requires that States Parties “take any necessary measures”, in 
accordance with their national context and circumstances, to ensure the full and effective 
national implementation of all provisions of the Convention.15 States Parties should also 
designate a National Contact Point responsible for coordinating national implementation 
activities and international exchange and cooperation within the BTWC. To promote 
transparency and reduce doubts and ambiguities under the Convention, States Parties have 
agreed on the exchange of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs).16 The CBMs are submitted 
annually and cover six thematic areas, including current biodefence activities, disease 
outbreaks, key life sciences publications, national biosecurity legislation and other measures, 
past offensive activities, and vaccine production facilities. In the current Intersessional Process 
2017-2021, approaches and measures for promoting national implementation and transparency 
are considered by the annual Meetings of Experts on Strengthening National Implementation 
(MX3). Health security, relevant export and import controls, and management of the security 
implications of life sciences advances are core elements of the effective national 
implementation of the BTWC. Integrated national approaches for strengthening biological 
security provide an essential framework for the development, implementation, and refinement 
of policies, measures, and actions designed to enhance prevention, detection, preparedness, and 
response capacities.17 Fostering biological security and awareness among life science 
stakeholders is vital to promoting common understanding and cross-sectorial cooperation.18 It 
is important that the CBMs are regularly updated to keep pace with ongoing developments. 
Together with several other States Parties, the UK has drawn attention to the need for declaring 
vaccine production facilities in a State Party’s territory irrespective of whether such facilities 
are licensed by their Government or by that of another State.19 Voluntary peer-review exercises 
that complement the BTWC CBMs process can facilitate national implementation through 
experience sharing.20  
 
Assistance, Response and Preparedness under the BTWC (MX4) 
6. Disease outbreaks can have significant consequences and put a serious strain on States’ 
capacity to adequately respond to biological threats, as evidenced by the ongoing COVID-19 
pandemic. Article VII of the BTWC provides a mechanism for States Parties to request and 
receive assistance in case they have been exposed to a biological weapon use.21 The effective 
operationalisation of this Article constitutes an essential element of the process of countering 
biological threats regardless of their origins and ensuring the integrity of the international norm 
against the misuse of life sciences. In the current Intersessional Process 2017-2021, approaches 
and concepts for strengthening Article VII are considered by the annual Meetings of Experts 
on Assistance, Response and Preparedness (MX4). States Parties acknowledge that the absence 
of a designated international lead authority on issues related to deliberate biological releases 





implementation of Article VII.22 Proposals to address these include the development of 
standardised procedures for requesting assistance, the setting up of an emergency response and 
assistance roster (e.g., as part of the existing BTWC Cooperation and Assistance Database), 
and the establishment of nationally-operated rapid response biomedical teams that could be 
delegated to a BTWC-maintained roster and deployed in the event of a public health 
emergency.23 Underscoring the need for an international coordinating body, the UK has 
recommended the development of a generic international plan that outlines a structure for 
coordinated response by Member States, the UN and the wider UN system (e.g. WHO, OIE, 
UN FAO, INTERPOL).24 In developing the envisaged structure and setting clear requirements 
for coordination, expertise, and decision-making, the experience of previous international 
health emergency response operations could be leveraged, taking into account national and 
international existing capabilities. 
 
Institutional Strengthening of the Convention (MX5) 
7. Since the failure of the Protocol negotiations in 2001-2002, division has persisted between 
States Parties on the contested subject of the institutional strengthening of the Convention with 
discussion25 focusing on the ‘benefits and challenges’ of two types of approaches, namely a 
comprehensive approach and one relying on incremental steps based on the adoption of 
individual measures. Thus, the issue of verification continues to lack consensus amongst States 
Parties. A December 2020 online meeting on institutional strengthening (MX 5) reflected 
previous discussions on this topic and noted the highly dynamic environment in which the 
Convention exists, and the range of stakeholders involved. Proposals have included the creation 
of a multilateral coordination body based upon the BTWC, enhancing the role and capacity of 
the BWC Implementation Support Unit, and strengthening the Intersessional Programme of 
Work after the Ninth Review Conference.26 A range of possible mechanisms for strengthening 
different aspects of the BTWC are also considered within the other Meetings of Experts. These 
include the establishment of a standing body for the review of science and technology, the 
development of a BTWC code of conduct for life scientists, and the provision of practical 
mechanisms for experience sharing, such as the creation of searchable databases and a platform 
for peer-review exercises and experience exchange. 
 
3 The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 
8. The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which entered into force in 1997, currently has 
193 States Parties committed to fully abiding by its obligations. The Convention, under Article 
1, allows for the controlled peaceful use of toxic chemicals and prohibits the development, 
production, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons “under any circumstances.” 
States Parties are also prohibited from engaging in any “military preparations to use chemical 
weapons” or to “assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity 
prohibited…under this Convention”. In addition, Article 1 also requires that all existing stocks 
of chemical weapons and relevant production facilities be destroyed.27 The primary focus of 
the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the CWC’s implementing 
body, has been the identification and destruction of all existing chemical weapons arsenals and 





chemical weapons stockpiles in the near future, the OPCW has been giving increasing attention 
and resources to a broader array of activities aimed at preventing the re-emergence of chemical 
weapons. The Conference of the States Parties (CSP) is the principal decision-making organ of 
the OPCW and oversees the implementation of the Convention. It meets annually and holds a 
Review Conference every five years to comprehensively examine the operations of the 
Convention and determine the strategic direction of the work of the OPCW. Unfortunately, for 
certain issues – notably, establishing a mechanism to identify the perpetrators of chemical 
weapons attacks in Syria and elsewhere - States Parties at the Fourth CWC Review Conference 
in 2018 and in subsequent CSP meetings were unable to reach consensus and so employed 
OPCW voting decision making processes. Despite the significant difficulties, it is vital that all 
States Parties work constructively to address the multi-faceted issues discussed below, at the 
current CSP and thereafter. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, in 2020 the CSP held a two-day 
instead of a regular five-day session and is expected to resume its work in Spring 2021. 
 
Syria  
9. In 2013, a limited multilateral consensus was reached on the Syrian chemical weapon issue. 
This resulted in the accession of Syria to the CWC and the destruction of most of its chemical 
weapons capability. Subsequently, two key issues have emerged. First, there are accusations 
that Syria has retained an aspect of its chemical weapon capability – and this comes in the 
context of gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies in Syria’s declarations to the OPCW.29 The 
second issue concerns the continued systematic use of chemical weapons by the Syrian 
government – including the use of chemical warfare agents as well industrial toxic chemicals 
such as chlorine. These attacks are well-documented by the OPCW Fact-finding Mission in 
Syria, which has confirmed several chlorine attacks which took place between 2014 - 2018, the 
presence of nerve agent at an undeclared government facility, as well as the use of nerve agent 
in Khan Skaykhun (2017).30 Further investigations by the OPCW-UN Joint Investigation 
Mechanism and the OPCW Investigation and Identification Team have attributed responsibility 
for specific attacks - identifying the air bases31 and specific units involved therein.32 There have 
been a number of unilateral and multilateral actions against Syria including sanctions and air-
strikes against CW-linked facilities. Russia and Syria continue to deny that Syria has ever used 
chemical weapons or retains a capability.  The UK has made it clear that it will continue to 
place pressure on Syria though the UN Security Council and OPCW33 - similar statements and 
actions have been undertaken by a large number of States in this regard. There is a need for 
sustained plurilateral State support for a wide range of investigatory, archival and criminal 
mechanisms to ensure those responsible for the Syrian chemical attacks and other violations of 
the chemical weapons prohibition regime are identified and held accountable.  
 
Novichoks  
10. The use of Novichok chemical agents in the poisoning in the UK of Sergei and Yulia Skripal 
(2018) and in Russia of Alexei Navalny (2020) has led to allegations that Russia maintains a 
chemical weapon programme. These incidents have motivated actions against Russia as well 
as attempts to strengthen the global chemical weapon prohibition regime. During the Cold War 





‘Novichoks’ (Russian for ‘newcomer’). With the coming into force of the CWC in 1997, the 
development, production, transfer, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons, was 
comprehensively prohibited by the CWC. However, while these Novichoks were clearly 
covered by the scope of the prohibition they were not listed in the Schedules of restricted 
chemicals which possessor States should declare.34 This omission reflected a desire to prevent 
this issue becoming a sticking point during the negotiation of the emerging Convention - this 
ambiguity would remain a politically sensitive albeit marginal issue.35 The Novichok poisoning 
of the Skirpals in Salisbury reasserted the need to address this ambiguity. And in June 2020, 
following a protracted negotiation the CWC schedules were amended to include Novichoks.36 
Later that year, the OPCW Technical Secretariat confirmed that a Novichok agent had also been 
used in the poisoning of Alexei Navalny.37 This has led to a joint statement by 56 CWC States 
Parties re-asserting their confidence in OPCW findings, the seriousness of this incident, and 
reiterating the need for Russian cooperation and transparency.38 In addition, the UK asserted 
that there was “no plausible explanation for Mr Navalny’s poisoning other than Russian 
involvement and responsibility” and called on Russia to fully declare its Novichok programme 
to the OPCW.39 A view echoed by several other States - and reflected in recent EU sanctions 
against Russian individuals implicated in the attack.40 These incidents have reiterated the 
importance of intelligence sharing, international investigative and criminal procedures as well 
as OPCW routine declaration and verification processes.41 
 
Central Nervous System-Acting Chemicals 
11. The development and use of weapons employing central nervous system (CNS)-acting 
chemicals for armed conflict is prohibited under the CWC. 42 However certain States have  
explored development, purportedly for law enforcement purposes, of weapons employing such 
chemicals, for use against individuals and, in aerosolised form, against groups. In October 2002, 
Russia used CNS-acting chemicals against armed Chechen separatists holding 900 hostages in 
a Moscow theatre. Although the bulk of the hostages were freed, more than 120 were killed by 
the still undisclosed chemical agents. 43 State interest in these weapons has continued despite 
the grave dangers to health, and risks of their use in human rights violations and armed conflict. 
44 And there is growing disquiet that rapid advances in relevant chemical and life sciences will 
be harnessed to their development. The Royal Society has warned of “active interest in 
performance degradation applications of neuroscience for both military and law enforcement 
purposes” and highlighted “indications of interest among a number of States in the development 
and use of incapacitating chemical agents.” 45 A 2014 survey by Bradford University 
documented research potentially applicable to the study or development of these weapons, 
notably Russian computer modelling of “calmative” employment against groups of individuals 
in enclosed spaces and exploration of potential CNS-acting chemical agent interaction with 
human receptor sites; as well as Chinese manufacture and promotion of CNS-acting weapons 
targeting individuals, and their possession by Chinese security forces. 46 In 2019 and 2020, 
during meetings of the UN Conference on Disarmament and the OPCW, the US raised concerns 
that both Iran and Russia were conducting research into CNS-acting agents that was 
inconsistent with the CWC and was “for offensive purposes”. 47  Recently there have been 
concerted attempts by a group of CWC States, led by Australia, Switzerland and the US, to 
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clarify that “under the CWC the aerosolized use of CNS-acting chemicals is inconsistent with 
law enforcement purposes”; 48 all such attempts have been opposed by Russia. 
Riot Control Agents (RCAs) 
12. Riot control agents (RCAs) - tear gases and pepper sprays - are defined by the CWC as “any 
chemical not listed” in one of three Schedules of restricted chemicals that can produce “rapidly 
in humans sensory irritation or disabling physical effects which disappear within a short time 
following termination of exposure.” 49 Their use as a “method of warfare” is prohibited under 
the CWC.50 The Convention, however, permits the use of such chemicals for “law enforcement 
including domestic riot control purposes,”51 provided they are used in “types and quantities” 
consistent with such purposes.52 RCAs are employed around the world for law enforcement 
purposes, notably for controlling or dispersing crowds as well as for facilitating arrest and 
restraint of individuals. However, they have been frequently misused for serious human rights 
violations, most commonly in non-custodial settings to restrict, intimidate, or punish those 
participating in public protest the world over; and also in the prisons, detention centres or police 
stations of certain countries to ill-treat individuals. 53 A recurring medical concern has been 
their use in excessive quantities in the open air or in confined spaces, including hospitals, 
prisons, homes, and even automobiles, where the targeted individuals cannot disperse. In such 
situations, serious injury or death can result from the toxic properties of the chemical agents or 
from asphyxiation. This is particularly true for the old, young, or sick. 54  These longstanding 
concerns have been exacerbated during the COVID-19 pandemic. Medical professionals have 
highlighted the danger that RCAs could raise COVID-19 risk to individuals by increasing 
respiratory tract susceptibility to infection.55 Furthermore, RCA-induced sneezing, coughing 
and increased mask removal exacerbate the threat of contagion, as does the breakdown of social 
distancing caused by RCA-induced disorientation and crowd panic. Such effects, clearly 
relevant to the policing of public assemblies, are exacerbated further if RCAs are used in 
confined spaces, notably prisons and other places of detention.56
RCA Means of Delivery 
13. The current situation could dramatically worsen as a result of contemporary development, 
marketing, and subsequent deployment of systems capable of delivering significant amounts of 
RCA over wide areas or extended distances. In addition to potential misuse for collective ill-
treatment or punishment of crowds, such ‘wide-area’ RCA delivery mechanisms could be 
employed as ‘force multipliers’ in conjunction with firearms, making lethal force more deadly 
on a large scale. Although nominally developed for law enforcement, they may also be 
incorporated into military arsenals, and subsequently used in armed conflict in contravention 
of the CWC. In 2018, the OPCW Scientific Advisory Board warned that availability of certain 
systems “opens up the possibility that they could be filled intentionally with alternate types of 
chemicals including CWAs [chemical warfare agents] or CNS [central nervous system]-acting 
compounds.”57 These concerns are exacerbated by current weak trade controls that could result 
in acquisition and misuse by nonstate actors, including terrorist organizations. Bradford 
University and the Omega Research Foundation have documented development and promotion 





denial devices, multiple projectile launchers, large calibre projectiles, and delivery mechanisms 
mounted on remote weapons systems, unmanned ground vehicles, and drones.58 To date, 
widespread employment has not been documented. But we may now be at a tipping point – 
where proliferation, use and misuse may be beginning – as witnessed by the Israeli security 
force use of commercially available drones against mass Palestinian protests along the Israeli-
Gaza strip border in April and May 2018. These drones were documented flying above the 
crowds dropping tear gas projectiles onto people below, in some cases against peaceful 
protestors, bystanders, journalists and field medical facilities.59 
 
4 Conclusions and Recommendations 
14. It is evident that the international chemical and biological disarmament and non-
proliferation regimes need to be strengthened, so that they function as a wide-ranging integrated 
system of governance measures. There could be an opportunity to make progress in 
strengthening the regimes if sufficient political attention can be maintained on the issue in the 
run up to the Ninth Review Conference of the BTWC in 2021 and the Fifth Review Conference 
of the CWC in 2023. Specifically, in regard to the BTWC, it is essential that States Parties 
promote the full and effective implementation of the Convention by enhancing its institutional 
capacity, developing compliance mechanisms, and establishing a systematic process for 
assessing the security risks and benefits of life science advances. With regard to the CWC, 
every effort should continue to be made to ensure the stability, unity and effective functioning 
of the OPCW, and consequently to achieve solutions reached by consensus, wherever possible. 
However, where consensus is not possible, the UK, in conjunction with like-minded States, 
must continue to employ the OPCW’s decision making mechanisms to ensure progress is made 
in directly addressing all instances of development and use of chemical weapons, wherever and 
in whatever form they take. Failure to do so risks weakening international confidence in the 
OPCW and undermining the absolute global prohibition on chemical weapons of all kinds. In 
regard to the particular issues that have been discussed in this report, it is recommended that 
the following proposals are considered by the UK and other States Parties to the BTWC and 
CWC. 
In regard to the BTWC States Parties should: 
- Promote the peaceful uses of life sciences through cooperation and assistance under the 
Convention. States Parties should further develop and enhance the implementation of 
the BTWC Cooperation Database.  
- Ensure that the security implications of life sciences research are effectively assessed 
and managed in an agreed review process. The development of a biological security 
code of conduct for life scientists can strengthen the review process of relevant scientific 
and technological advances. 
- Promote the full and effective national implementation of the BTWC by improving the 
system of Confidence Building Measures, enhancing stakeholder engagement with the 
Convention, and strengthening the utility of Peer Review Exercises.  
- Promote the implementation of an integrated approach to countering the threat of 
deliberate disease. Strengthening international coordination, cooperation, and capacity 
building under the BTWC can advance global health security and prevent the hostile 
misuse of life sciences. 
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- Consider possible approaches and measures for the institutional strengthening of the
Convention. It is essential that an Intersessional Programme of Work is agreed at the
Ninth Review Conference in 2021 and that the mandate and resources of the
Implementation Support Unit are expanded.
In regard to the CWC 
- There is no single pathway to justice in regard to the use of chemical weapons in Syria. 
There remains a need for sustained plurilateral State support for a wide range of 
investigatory, archival and criminal mechanisms which will ensure that those who have 
breached the global chemical weapon prohibition are identified and held accountable.
- States must support intelligence sharing, international investigative and criminal 
procedures in relation to recent uses of Novichoks and support OPCW expert review 
and updating of CWC verification schedules and declaration processes to address 
challenges posed by this group of agents.
- Until the OPCW collectively determines the applicability of the CWC with regard to 
the use of CNS-acting chemicals for law enforcement purposes, CWC States Parties 
should introduce national moratoria on development, manufacture, promotion, transfer, 
acquisition, stockpiling and use of all weapons employing such agents.
- All CWC State Parties must uphold the prohibition on use of riot control agents as a 
"method of warfare". They must further ensure that RCA use for law enforcement 
purposes is consistent both with international human rights law and the Chemical 
Weapons Convention, cognisant of the increased health risks due to COVID-19.
- All CWC State Parties should collectively establish an OPCW process to determine 
those RCA delivery mechanisms that are prohibited under the Chemical Weapons 
Convention and develop guidance on appropriate use of permitted RCA delivery 
mechanisms.
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